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Welfare  benefits to Morocco  from a free trade agreement  with
the European  Community  would be about 1.5 percent  of GDP.
But welfare  benefits would  be 2.5 percent  of GDP if Morocco
liberalized  trade with the whole  world  - and  with only slightly
higher adjustment  costs.
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Selected  Mediterranean  Countries"  (RPO  675-64).  Copies  of this paper  are avaihble free  from the Wor.d
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Morocco  is interested  in developing  a reciprocal  the rest of the world  - with only slightly  higher
free trade agreement  with the European  Commu-  adjustment  costs.  Liberalizing  trade with the
nity (EC),  although  it already  enjoys free access  world  would  provide  great.-r  benefits  because  it
to EC markets in industrial  products and is not  would  eliminate  the trade diversion  costs associ-
obligated  to give EC exporters  reciprocal  access.  ated with discriminatory  trade liberalization.
But Moroccan  agricultural  exports are impeded  (Although  the fact that significant  benefits  would
by agricultural  protecdon  in the European  accrue from discriminatory  liberalization  against
Community.  imports  from  either the European  Community  or
the rest of the world indicates  that trade diver-
A free  trade agreement  would require  that  sion is not dominant.)
Morocco  lower . s moderately  high tariffs
against  its most important  trading  partner.  Tariff  * As a result  of improved  access  to the
reductions  against  the European  Community  but  European  Community,  employmcnt  and output
not against  the rest of the world  may provide  in the vegetable  and citrus fruit sectors would
benefits  provided  the trade diversion  costs of  expand.  But the phosphate  sector  stands to gain
preferential  tariff reduction  do not dominate.  most from the free  trade agreement  because
liberalization  would  induce a depreciation  in the
Rutherford,  Rutstr6m,  and Tarr apply  a 39  real exchange  rate.
sector  general  equilibrium  model of the Moroc-
can economy  which includes  the sectors most  * Morocco's  cereal,  meat, dairy, and sugar
likely to be affected  by such an agreement.  They  sectors would  lose most in terms of employment,
investigate  the economic  effects  of the prospec-  because  of significantly  lower import  prices from
tive free trade agreement  as well as five other  the European  Community.  The nontraded  goods
trade liberalization  scenarios  for Morocco.  sector  would also contract  slightly.
Among  their most important  findings:
*The  value-added  tax would  have  to be
* The welfare  benefits  to Morocco  from a free  increased  to compensate  for the loss in tariff
trade agreement  with the European  Community  revenues,  on which Morocco  depends.
would  be about 1.5  percent of GDP. Such
substantial  welfare  gains partly reflect  the  Estimates  are provided  as ranges, with
benefits  of reducing  dispersion  in the tariff  probability  assessments,  because  of the element
regime.  of uncertainty.
* Welfare  benefits  of about  2.5 percent  of
GDP would  accrue from liberalizing  trade with
The  Policy  Research  Working  Ppe  Series  disseminates  the  fuidings  of work  under  way  in  theBank  Anobjectiveof  the  series
is to get these  findings  out  quickly,  even if presentz  dons  are  less than  fully polished.  The findings,  interpretatims,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do  not  necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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Since 1986 Morocco  has shown an interest  in developing  a closer  trade
association  with  the  European  Community  (EC).  Thli  interest  culminated  in  March
1992  with concretes  discussions  for  a reciprocal  Froa  Trade  Agreement  with the
EC.  To  some the  Moroccan  interest  may be surprising,  since  Morocco  already  enjoys
privileged  relations  with the EC. It has freo  access  to markets in industrial
products  (there  are  some  minor  exceptions  such  as  trousers  and  canned  sardLnes),
and  is  not  obligated  to  provide  reciprocal  access  to Lts  market  to producers  of
the  EC.  However,  EC  agricultural  protection  impedes  Moroccan  exports  (notably  in
the  areas  of  vegetables  and  citrus  fruits),  so  that  improved  access  to  EC  markets
is an important  issue.  Moreover,  the reciprocal  obligations  of a Free Trade
Agreement  (FTA)  with  the  SC  will  require  that  Morocco  lower  its  moderately  high
tariffs  against  its  most  important  trade  partner.  These  tariff  reductions  against
the  EC  may  provide  additional  trade  liberalization  benefits  to  Morocco,  provided
the trade  diversion  costs  of preferential  tariff  reduction  do not  dominate.
This paper  reports  on an applied  general  equilibrium  modelling  exercise
that investigates  the economic  eQ  fects of the Moroccan  proposal.  Given the
questions  of  improved  market  access  of  Moroccan  fruits  and vegetables  and of
trade  diversion  and  trade  creation  (which  arises  in  any  preferential  trade  area),
we decompose  the effects  on the  Moroccan  economy  from this proposal  into  the
following  six  policy  scenarios:  a)  improved  access  for  Moroccan  fruits  and
vegetables  in  the  EC ("ACCESS");  b)  unilateral  tariff  reductions  in Morocco
against  the  EC  alone  ("ECLIB"),  against  imports  from  the  rest  of  the  world  alone
("LIBROW"),  and  against  all  trading  partners  ("LIBALL"),  without  improved  access
to  EC agricultural  markets;  c)  cooperative  tariff  reductions  with  the  EC,  where
on  the  EC side  this  implies  extended  market  access  for  Moroccan  fruit  and
vegetables  ("FTA");  and  d)  full  free  trade  agreement  with  the  EC augmented  by
unilateral  liberalization  of  tariffs  against  rest of world  imports  ("FTAALL").
Our  analysis  provides  a  quantitative  indication  of the  income  gain  to  Morocco  of
these  strategies.Among our most important  results,  we find that the welfare  benefits  to
Morocco  from  the  free  trade  agreement  are  about  1.5  of  percent  CDP,  and  are  about
2.5 percent  of GDP if  Morocco adds  trade liberalization  with the rest of the
world  to the  free  trade  agreement.  These  welfare  gains  are  quite  substantial  ln
the  context  of  other  model  estimates  with  constant  returns  to scale  such  as  ours,
and partly  reflect  benefits  from  eliminating  dispersion  in the tariff  regime,
since dispersion  is eliminated  in the process  of liberalization.  The larger
welfare  gains  from  Morocco  adding  elimination  of protection  against  the  rest  of
the  world  to a free trade  agreement  with the EC, reflects  the trade  diversion
costs  associated  with  discriminatory  trade  liberalizaticon.  On  the  other  hand,  the
significant  benefits  that accrue from discriminatory  liberalization  agail.at
either EC or rest of world imports indicates  that trade diversion is not
dominant.
One interesting  conclusion  is that broader  trade liberalization  yields
greater  welfare gain than the PTA, but wlth only alightly  hLgher  adjustment
Coste.  Thls  can  be seen  as  an lmportant  argument  ln  favor  of the  efforts  towards
lowering  tariffs  against  non-EC  sources  subsequent  to achieving  a FTA.
We evaluate  the  overall  welfare  sffects  on the  Moroccan  economy  from  the
above scenarios,  as well as the sectoral  impacts.  The sectoral  impacts  are
particularly  Lmportant  glven  the emphasis  that has been placed  in Morocco  on
dLversLfication  of production  and  exports,  .. e  well as concern  over  the  costs  of
adjustment.  The  model  provides  a  quantltative  indication  of  the  extent  of  output
(not  reported)  and  employment  (report.  1 below)  adjustment  that  will  be  required
by  industry.  We  find  that  although  citrus  frults  and  vegetables  expand  as
expected  from  their improved  access  to the NC market  from  the  PTA,  by far  the
sector  that gains the most from the trade liberalizatlon  scenarios is the
phosphate  sector.  Phosphate  exports  expand  sLgniflcantly  after  the  PTA  or other
trade  liberalization  scenarios  due  to  the  deprecLatlon  of  the  real  exchange  rato
induced  by the liberalization. Conversaly,  non-traded  goods  sectors  slightly
contract  after  the PTA  or other  liberalizing  scenarios.  The  largest  losers  of
employment,  however,  are  the cereals,  meat and dairy  and sugar  sectors.  These
2sectors face significantly  lower import  prices after trade liberalization.
Estimates  are provided  within a range (wLth  probability  assessments  over the
range),  as there is an element  of uncertainty  in the  estimate.  which we also
quantify.
Given  the importance  of the  tariff  au an instrumekt  of  revenue  generation
in  Morocco,  we exploit  the  ability  of a  "simulation  laboratory"  to zontrol  for
this  effect  by  adopting  the  value  added  t&c  (VAT)  as  an  explicit  replacement  tax
such  that  government  revenue  rem  tns  con'tant.  The  VAT induces  distortion  coats
(marginal  excess  burden).  We indicate  the  extent  the  VAT  would  have  to  be  changed
.in  order  to  avoid  a  reduction  in  government  revenue.  The  w'arginal  excess  burden
of  raising  government  revenue  from  the  VAT is  incorporated  in  the analysis.
The  model  we uoe  is  a  39  sector  computable  general  equilibrium  model  of  the
Moroccan  economy.  This level  of disaggregation  captures  most of the important
sectors of  the Moroccan economy that would be affected by the Free Trade
Agreement.  In  particular,  citrus  fruits,  vegetables,  cereals,  sugar  and  meat  and
dairy products, textiles, apparel, fishing and phosphates are included  as
separate sectors. The model that we use  in deliberately  very simple, to
facilitate  the  confrontation  of  policy-makers'  intuition  with  easily  interpreted
simulations.  The  model  assumea  no  terms-of-trade  eofocts,  a  single  household,  no
capital  accumulation,  and  constant  returns  to  scale  production  with  competitLve
pricing.  In  addition,  the  model is  a "comparative  statics"  model  which ignores
the  costs  of  adjustment of  factors. Consequently,  the  benafits of  the
integration-liberalization  scenarios  will be les  than our estimates  to the
extent  of costs  of adjustment.
2  *  A  SMULL  OPEN  ECONOMY  MODEL
2.1  Trade  Protection  in  Morocco  and  the  Free  Trade  Agreement  shocks
Structure  of  Protection.
Since  1983  Morocc has  dramatically  liberalized  its  foreign  trade  regime.
In  1983  import  licenses  were  required  in  all  sectors,  tariff  rates  were  high  and
dispersed  (some  over 1CA% in a4-  -cn  to the special  import  tax of 15%),  and
3there  were  export  licensing  requirements  and  a  state  marketing  board  monopoly  on
exports  of  processed  food  products.'  In  198S,  the  maximum  rate  for  customs  duties
was lowered  to 45%. Mout impressively,  ?  -A'occo  'as progressively  reduced  its
import  licensing  requLrements  so  that  by 1993  no imports  will require  a license
(other  than for health and safety  reasons).  On the export side only minor
restraints  remain  since  special  customs  regimes  for  exporters  were  extended  and
improved,  export licensing  was removed  with only  a  few exceptions,  and the
monopoly  of the state  marketing  board  was abolished  (see  Mateus  et al. (1988,
p.ll)J. We therefore  take  as  our  point  of  departure,  a  trade  regime  that  is  free
of non-tariff  barriers.
Tariff  rates  as of 1991  by sector  are  presented  in  column  10  of table  1.
The structure  of the rates  is taken  from legal  applicable  rates  at the tariff
line  level  that  are  aggregated,  based  on  an  unweighited  average,  to  the  39  sectors
of  our  model.  Legal  tariff  rates,  however,  are not Indicative  of actual  tariff
collections,  because  there  are  exemptions  to the tariff  (as  well as exemptions
to the  fiscal  import  tax  and  the  value-added  tax)  for  a  number  of  purposes,  most
importantly  for  inputs  into  products  that  will  be  exported.  In view of the
importance  of the revenue implications  of the proposed tariff changes,  we
therefore  proportionally  adjusted  all  the  legal  rates.  The  rates  that appear  in
table  10  have  been  proportionately  adjusted  for  all  sectors,  such  that  the  total
tariff  collections  in  the  economy,  based  on  1991  imports,  equals  actual  aggregate
tariff  collections  from  budget  data  for  1991.2 The  average  import  tariff  based
on collections  is 19%,  which includes  tariff  surcharge  (fiscal  import  duty). 3
The  most important  sectors  regarding  import  revenues  are Industrial  Machinery,
and Coal and Crude  Oil, which together  account  for over 30% of revenues  from
trade  taxes.
Among the  most important  non-tariff  barriers  scheduled  to be removed  in
early  1993  are  those  in  several  agriculture  sectors:  sugar,  cereals,  meat,  dairy
't8.  Mateus  at al. 19881  and UNDP-Wordd  Bank  (19921  for detols.
'Appendix  B dicus  thds  adjument
'As memben  of the Msghreb  pmferential  tmding ae,  inoas  fiom Algea  an  Tunisa are exempted  frnm the fial  import duty.
4Table 1: Morocco - Basic Data for the Socild Accounting Matrix
8ECTOR  (Abbrov.)  SECTOR  SHARB  OP TOTAL:  TRADE  BY SECTOR:  TARWPRA
(In percent)  (In percent)
(1)  (2)  (3%  (4)  (5)  '6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Output  Labor  Capital  Imports  % fromEC  El. wur:  %to eC  lmoogir  Er
______________________________  .________________  ___________  _  Consumption  Output
kORICULTURB
1.  Cereals  (CER)  R  5.44  3.04  10.32  7.16  53.8  0.85  54.2  13.20  150  45*
2.  Sugar  (SUG)  R  0.26  0.12  0.41  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00  45*
3.  Citrus  FruIts (Cfl)  R  2.18  1.50  2.84  0.03  64.8  9.26  69.8  0.40  40.20  31.56
4,  Vegetables  (VEO)  R  1.84  1.14  2.15  0.26  100,0  2.75  dP.6  2.40  14.00  1135
5.  Meat  and Dairy  (MAD)  R  4.90  1.62  9.88  0.23  50.2  0.02  100.0  0.70  0.00  45S*
6.  Eshln  (FSN)  R  0.38  0.08  0.25  0.00  64.8  0.66  53.6  0.00  16.30
7. Forestry  and Other Agri-
cultue (FOR)  1.02  0.51  1.74  2.44  59.4  0.17  86.6  32.80  7.00  29.54
MINIG  AND  RELATED  _
8. Phosphates  (PHS)  2.52  2.5  4.04  0.00  0.0  22.45  51.1  0.00  89.20
9.  Other Non-Metallic  Mining
(NDM)  R  0.40  0.46  0.30  1.99  7.7  0.73  41.2  41.10  15.40  16.48
10.  Metals  Mining  (MIN)  R  0.59  0.58  0.91  0.14  86.4  4.57  80.6  18.30  81.40  14.74
11. Coal and  Crude  Oil (CAO)  R  0.16  0.47  0.08  18.82  1.6  0.14  84.2  96.20  22.90  11.35
12.  Refined  Oil (OIL)  4.14  031  0.20  1.89  51.6  2.19  73.9  19.50  7.50  23.80
13.  Electricity  and Water
J(ELB)  1.80  1.54  1.77  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00
piANUAClU  RJINO_
14.  Food  Products (POO)  4.10  5.38  0.95  3.38  53.6  0.44  95.7  10.90  1.00  35.23
15.  Other  Food Products (OFP)  5.40  4.24  2.16  3.98  47.7  7.40  633  12.90  13.30  27.91
16. Bverages and Tobaeco
(DEV)  1.01  1.84  0.51  0.34  76.8  153  94.2  5.30  15.00  30.02
17. Texties (T)  4.10  6.07  2.28  5.3C  71.0  625  61.0  21.10  14.40  25.30
18  Clothing  (CLO)  2.31  2.27  1.81  0.02  86.7  4.02  94.1  0.20  1550  34.13
19. Leather and Shoes  (LEA)  1.24  1.88  0.68  0.15  89.5  4.78  71.5  2.40  3850  24.01
20.  Wooden  ProducU  (WDS)  1.9S  2.93  0.64  2.36  31.4  C.26  83.7  17.60  3.00  19.98
21.  Pper  and Printing  (PAP)  1.11  1.92  029  2.27  47.1  0.92  69.4  28.20  8.20  27.65
22.  Cement  (CEM)  1.66  358  0.41  0.95  38.1  0.11  682  11.00  0.70  21.86
23.  Iron and  Steel (LAS)  0.46  0.44  0.12  657  63.3  1.87  79.2  75.60  31.90  16.84
24.  Electro-Mchncal Ind.
ustry  (E  ai)  1.79  3.93  1.12  2.29  88.9  0.11  87.3  22.60  0.60  21.45
25.  Industrial  Machinery
(IND)  0.98  0.74  0.62  17.83  45.3  0.06  68.2  74.10  0.60  20.44
26.  Transport  Equipment (TEQ)  1.14  153  0.46  4S6  62.4  0.25  66.1  46.90  2.10  15.04
27.  Electrical  Equipment
(E!O)  0.78  1.40  0.17  3.84  57.4  0.13  99.4  49.80  1.60  2.I1
28.  Offlce  Machinery  (MAC)  0.07  0.04  0.02  1.06  73.9  0.02  9c2  73.70  1.90  30.54
29.  Chenicals (CUM)  3.41  3.80  2.45  .15  67.1  7.41  29.4  34.90  21.20  19.40
30. Rubber and Plastics  (RBR)  0.75  1.22  0.24  L03  74.5  0.15  20.5  21.50  0.80  23.16
31.  Other  Industries (OTH  0.33  0.44  0.18  0.19  77.2  .05  44.7  11.00  1.50  26.26
ERVICES
32.  Construction  (CON)  9.51  3.83  6.44  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00
33. Trade (TRD)  12.57  2.99  21.61  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00
34. Transport  (TRN)  5.49  3.87  4.19  1.41  100.0  9.39  57.2  4.80  20.90  10.00
35.  Cormunicatons (COM)  0.50  0.46  0.70  0.01  100.0  0.02  57.2  0.40  0.60  10.00
36.  Banking  (BNK)  1.63  1.73  2.10  0.00  100.0  0.02  57.2  3.00  9.30
37.  Insurmce  (INS)  0.34  038  0.00  0.00  100.0  1.24  57.2  3.20  10.70  10.00
38.  Other  Services  (SRV)  11.82  6.99  14.87  0.86  100.0  7.70  57.2  1.20  7.60  10.00
39.  Administration  (ADM)  12.86  2.85  0.00  0.00  0.0  0.00  . 0.00  0.00  _  =
*  Sectors  marked R (for resource)  have sector-sopccfic  capital.
4Nontariff  barrier estimated  at 45 pmecnt legal  tariff  rates after  adjustment  for collections  are 10  percent. 16  percent  and 28  perent
in  cereals.  sugar  and  meat and dairy respectively.and  edible  oils.  These  non-tariff  barriers  are  believed  to  be quite  binding,  and
Morocco  intends  to increase  tariffs  in  the  meat  ana  dairy  industries,  and  impose
variable  levies  in the others  to cushion  the adjustment  costs.  We therefore
assume  in  our  benchmark  that  the  tariff  levels  in the  meat and  dairy,  sugar  and
cereals  sectors  are  45 p6rcent.
Shockg  of  the  Free  Trdad  AqSegmet
An  a  reault  of  the  decade  long  liberalization  of  trade,  some
dlversificatlon  in exports  has  been  achieved,  mainly  in  textiles  and  phosphate
derivatives,  but the development  of export  markets  in agriculture  has been
inhibited  by  protectionist  policies  in  the  EC.  Given  the  generally  free  access
to EC markets  by Moroccan  producers,  SC restrictions  of importance  on imports
from  Morocco  only  remain  in  fruit  and  vegetables,  trousers,  and  canned  sardines.
At the  level  of aggregation  of  our  model,  increased  access  to the  EC  markets  for
Moroccan  products  will primarily  Lnfluence  the export  price  of the fruit  and
vegetable  sectors.4
The  Moroccan  Free  Trade  Agreement  proposal  would involve  a lor  aring  and
eventual  elLmination  of all  remaining  trade  barriers  on all  imports  from  the  EC
(i.e.,  lowering  of  the  tariff),  with  correspondingly  increased  market  access  for
Moroccan  products  into  the  EC,  most  notably  in agriculture.
We estimate  the  price  distortion  in  agriculture  due  to  border  barriers  in
the  EC  to  be about  8%,  following  the  EC  model  developed  by  Harrison,  Rutherford,
and Wooton [1989).  An  upperbound"  scenario  would assume that the EC demand
schedule  for  Moroccan  fruits  and  vegetables  is infinitely  elastic,  so that a
removal  of tariffs and other  barriers  will be entirely  passed  on to Moroccan
producers  as  an increase  in  the  export  price.  If  the  EC  demand  schedule  were less
than  infinitely  elastic,  the  price  increase  passed  on  to  Moroccan  exporters  would
be less  than  8. Moreover,  if  Moroccan  exporters  are  currently  capturing  some  of
the  rents  from  the  EC  trade  barriers,  then  the  export  price  increase  would  result
in less than the full 8% of benefits  to Moroccan  exporters.  Since Moroccan
4 Mormco's exporu in fruit and vegetables  are  dominated  by oaga  aed  aother ciua  fruits, which  are  both the major  conomponts  of our
citma fruits, and by tomatoer,  poatoes,  and  presetred vegeables, which  ae  the  major conmontas of our vegetables  sector.production  is small  relative  to EC demand  (suggesting  highly  elastic  demand  in
the EC),  and  since  the variable  levy  is assumed  to capture  rents  in the  EC,  we
take as our  base  case scenario  the full  0% increaue  in  the price  of fruits  and
vegetables  from improved  access  to the  SC market.
Domestic taxee consist of the value added tax  (VAT),  employment  and
corporation  taxes,  and  production  taxes  and  subsidies.  Sinco  we do not  have  good
updated data on collections  by sector 7 all of these rate-i  have been set
uniformly.  The most  important  '-ax  in eur model is the value-added  tax, and
import  taxation  is the  next  most important.  The legal  VAT rate is 19%,  applied
to  both  importe  and  domestic  production.  As  witl tmport  taxation,  however,  there
are  exemptions  to  the  VAT.  In  order  to  be consistent  with  aggregate  VAT  revenues
collected  on  domestic  production  and  imports,  the  domestic  VAT  rate  hao  been  set
to 3% and the rate applied to imports  to 11%.5  The VAT taxation  on imports
introduces  further  distortion  in the trade regime.6  The other tax rates are
calibrated  based  on aggregate  tax  collections  as  recorded  in  the  SAK.  They  ares
1%  production  tax (net  of subsidieo),  an 8% labor  tax (net  of subsidies),  and  a
St  corporation  tax (net  of subsidies).
'In the appwdix we provide a  detailed  documentationof  he  x rae  Wpled  In our mol.  Bely,  however, tal  Moroccan  valadded
in 1991  was 189.4  billion di;a2,  wile  total impots wer  59.7 bilion dirhm.  Valusimdded  tax an domesti snler foport)  was  5359  (7853)
mDllion  dirhams, which  represent. 3 percent of value-dded uad 11  pereeot of  iports.  We applied  tim  rat  to dte  uctue  of value-added
and impots in our  1980  SAM, which  yields an amount  of value-added  Sovernme  rev-'10 equal  to 32 percat of total  govenme  evne.
Import tae  (cluding  the P.F.I.) equal 11,465  million  didbms In 1991,  or 19  perce  of the valuo  of lmpots. We  cale all  cual
taiff  rates in 1991  so that the weighted  aveage lat  equals  ths  19 percent.  i  yields that 30 perct  of governmt  revenue  I  our mDode  Is
from taiff collections.
Actu  valuedded ad  tadff collectios i  1991  were 24 and 21 pec  of  ovem  n  rewve,  repetivey,  but these ae  Many
xes employed  in Morocco  that ar  not presnt  in our model (ach  n a pesnal  w  ,  exci  taxes, liceng  feew  and  a  corpora  tax.
With our mapping  we have  asured that the atmacure  of the VAT and  iipost ta  fomn  199&  gs  impimed  in our model.  Moteove, rogarding
what is importat for the revenue  implcatiorn of the model,  the relative  in_on  of toh VAT to impot te  u  a  percet of toWl  govemet
revenu is presved  approximately  (3230 verms 24121).
'Given that the VAT is appUied  on al  production  and in our model it i soo  rebated on expor,  iie entire VAT appled on impot  im  a
diseriminatory  tax on imponrs.  TeMr are two methods  of value-added  taxatio that do  ot dcdminate  agalt  imports:  (1) apply  the VAT on
all domestic  production,  including  that destined  for exports,  but do not apply  the VAT on Lmpors  (the origin principle);  or (2) apply  the VAT
on imporls and domestic  production  for the domestic  market  only (the destination  pdrciple). If all don_stc  production  is subject  to the VAT
and imports re  abo  taxed the VAT on import Is a discrminatorq  teaiff.
In Morcco,  an effort is made to rebate the VAT on exports.  Then, in principlo,  Morocco  implements  the VAT according  to the
desinadon principle,  and provided  the rebte  of VAT on eoRt  is complete,  the VAT is  not dIsrmbItory  against Imports.
62.2  general  Model Structure
Our Small  Open  Economy  (8OE)  model is  doslgnad  for  trade  policy  analjuiL
with a large  number  of sectors.  The model io a  "generic"  general  equilibrium
- model of a alngle economy along the llnes of de Molo and Tarr (19921  and
HarrLson,  Rutherford  and  Tarr '19931.
Goods  are  produced  using  primary  factors  and  intermediate  Lnputs.  Prlmary
factors Lnclude labor and capital.  Land is not included  expllcitly,  but we
nonetheless  have  a sector-opecLfLi  factor  by varylng  the  share  of capital  that
lo  sector-specific  in "resource"  sectors  ('he  nine ,esource  sectors  are  denoted
by an R following  their  names  in  table  1).  Labor  is assumed  fully  mobile  acroso
sectors.
Production  exhibLts constant  returns to  scale, and producers behave
competitively,  selecting  output  levels  such  that  marginal  cost  at  th.-%  output
levels  equals  the  glven  market  price.  In  export  sectors,  output  is  differentiated
between  goods  destined  for  the  domestLc,  EC and  all other  export  markets.  This
relatLonship is  characterized by  a  two-level  constant  elastLcity  of
transformation  frontier.  ComposLt*  output  is  an  aggregate  of  domestic  output  and
composite  exportel  composite  exports  are  an  aggregate  of  exports  for  the  SC and
non-EC  markets.
Final  demand  by  prlvate  households  arlses  from  nested  constant  elasticity
of  iubstitution  utility  functlons.  Thioa allows  consumer  decLison-making  to  occur
in  multi-stage  budgeting.  At  the  top  level,  goods  from  dLfferent  sectors  compete
subject  to  the  budget  constraint  of  the  consumer,  where  all  income  elasticities
are  unity.  In  tbh second  stage,  the  consumer  decides  how  much  to  spend  on
domestic  versus  aggregate  imports,  subject  to  income  allocated  to  spending  in  the
sector  from  the  first  stage,  with  possibly  different  elasticities  of  substitution
by commodity.  Finally,  having  decided  how much  to  spend  on  imports,  the  consumer
allocates  this  expendlture  on  SC versus  non-EC  imports.
In  two  sectors,  meat  and  dairy,  and  sugar,  we  depart  from  the  "Armington"
assumption  and  assume  that  imports  and  domestic  production  are  perfect
substitutes.  This  is  becauso  there  are  no (or  negligible)  imports  in  the  initial
7equilibrium  due to the non-tariff  barriers  discussed  above-  the  Armington
assumption,  without  very  high  elasticitLes  of  substitution,  will  imply  (contrary
to expectations)  that trade liberalization  yields very little increase in
imports.  In principle,  the  appropriate  model is the  one  that is bencnmarked  to
an econometrically  estimated  elasticity  of supply  in  the  sugar,  and  meat  and
dairy  Lndustries.  Absent  explicit  estimates,  we  use  the model  that  in  closest  to
o-r  assessment  of the  supply  elasticity.  In  our  sensitivity  analysis,  we adjust
che  share  of sector-specific  capital  and  thereby  the  supply  elasticity,  yielding
alternate  estimates  of  import  penetration  after  liberalization.
As  discussed  above,  the  only  Moroccan  trade  distortions  currently  included
in  the  model  are  ad valorem  tariffs  (or  subsidies)  on imports  and  a  value  added
tax that is applied  at different  rates  on imports  and domestLc  products.  The
model  allows  tariff  rates  on imports  to differ  depending  on whether  the import
is from the EC or  the rest of the world (ROW);  and we allow exports  to have
different  prices dependtng  on whether  they are sold in the SC or ROW. These
distinctions  allow  us to study  policies  such  as accession  to a free  trade  area.
The  Free  Trade  Association  with  the  SC  also  involves  changes  in  Morocco's  access
to EC markets.  The  main effect  of increased  access  would  be an increase  in  the
Moroccan  export  price,  and these  are  therefore  included  as policy  instruments
that  can  be  varied  in  counterfactual  simulations.
Government  expenditures  and  Investment  demand  are  exogenous.  Funding
of  government  expenditures  is  provided  by  net  tax  revenues.  There  are  three  other
components  of  government  income  in  addition  to  import  tariffs.  These  are  (i)
value-added  taxes  on  factor  inputs  to  production  and  on  imports,  (Li)  employment
and  corporation  taxes  on  factor  employment,  and  (iLi)  ad valorem  production
subsidies  net  of  excise  taxes  on  production  output.  In  a  counter-factual  scenario
the  value-added  tax  adjusts  endogenously  to  balance  government  (net)  tax  revenues
with  expenditures.  Thus  the  welfare  effects  of  changes  in  trade  policy  explicitly
incorporate  the  appropriate  marginal  excess  burden  of  raising  government  revenue
from  other  sources.
8Since  private  consumption  equals  the  income  from  primary  factors  plus  net
transfere  to  the  consumer  by  the  government  (from  domestic  and  foreign  trade
taxes),  Walras  law  is  satisfied.  Public  consumption  is  balanced  with  the  value
of  public  endowmeato  and  tax  revenue.
World  market  impurt  and  export  prices  are  fixed,  so  there  are  no  endogenous
changes  In  the  terms  of  trade.  In  other  words,  import  supplies  and  export  demands
are  infinitely  elastic.  The  current  account  balances  the  value  of  exports  and
imports  taking  into  account  exogenously-fixed  capital  inflows.  This  guarantees
no  "free-lunch"  either  taken  from  or  given  to  foreigners.7
2.3  Eupirical  implementation  of  the  Morocco  model
We employ  a  1980  Social  Accounting  Matrix  (SAM) for  Morocco  which
distinguishes  39  production  sectors.  This  provides  a  consistent  set  of  input-
output  relationships  showing  intermediate,  final  demand  and  value  added
transactions.  Table  1  summarizes  some  of  the  most  important  industry  data
employed  in  our  model,  and  displays  the  names  of  each  of  our  sectors  along  with
a  3-letter  acronym  for  later  reference.$  Columns  1-3  show  the  share  of  Moroccan
output,  employment  and  capital  by  sector,  derived  from  the 1980  8AM. Although  a
full  update  of  the  1980  SAM is unavailable,  appendix  B  shows  that,  at the  9
sector  level  of  aggregation,  output  shares  did  not  significantly  change  between
1980  and  1991.  Over  40%  of  both  output  and  factor  employment  originates  in  the
service  sectors,  about  30%  of  the  economy  is  in  manufacturing  (food  and  textiles
and  apparel  comprise  about  half  the  manufacturing  sector)  and  the  remaining  30%
is in  the  agricultural  and  mining  sectors.
Columns  4  and  6 display  the  sectoral  decomposition  of  imports  and  exports,
where  the  share  accounted  for  by  EC imports  and  exports  is  displayed  in  columns
5  and  7.  These  shares  are  updated  1991  data,  aggregated  from  tariff  line  data
provided  by  the  government  of  Morocco.  Phosphates  are  the  most  important  export
7A morm  formal  decription  of the model  is given  ia Appendix  D.
7bis SAM  was  constmoted  by Mstm et Ai.  (1988).
9sector,  and  they  encounter  no  trade  barriers  in the  ZC.  Fruit  and  vegetables
exports  together  make  up 14% of  all  exports  to  the  PC.
Columns  8  and  9  show  the  importance  of  trade  for  each  sector.  Clearly  the
mining  sectors  are  very  dependent  on  exports,  as  is  the  citrus  fruit  sector  to
a lesser  degree.  We therefore  expect  some  benefits  to this latter  sector  from
increased  access  to EC markets.
The benchmark  values  of all elasticities  in the model are reported  in
Appendix  A. Estimates  of elasticitie must be assembled  for  primary  factor
.substitution, import  demand,  import  source, domestic  demand,  and  the
transformation  of domestic  supply  into  domestic  and  exported  products. 9 Despite
our  literature search, there are many elasticities  about which  there is
considerable  uncertainty.  our  "remedy"  for  this  problem,  which  is  endemic  to  any
large-scale  model  of this  kind,  is  to  undertake  systematic  sensitivity  analyses
of  our  major  results  with  respect  to  plausible  bounds  on  these  elasticities.  Even
if  we are  unable  to specify  a  point  estimate  with  any  precision,  our  priors  over
the likely  bounds  that these  elasticities  could  take are quite strong.  To the
extent  that  our  major  conclusions  are  robust  to  perturbations  over  these  bounds,
we do not see  our uncertainty  over specific  values  of these  elasticities  as a
weakness  of the model.1 0 We report  the results  of these sensitivity  analyses,
which  involve  a minimum  of 1000  simulations  for  each  counter-factual  policy  in
Section  4. They  will allow  us to conclude  whether  or not our main results  are
robust,  at least  with respect  to plausible  uncertainty  over  elasticities.
We numerically  elaborate  in appendix  C, the  model  parameters  that  define
the  gross  substitute-complement  relationship between domestic and  export
production.  Although  this relationship  is important  for  sectors  such  as citrus
'11in  detail, thene  elasticities  refer  to the elasticy of  ubstitution  betwen primay  fuctor of production  in each  ector;  the elasticity  of
substitution  between  domestic  production ad an impoes composite  in each  ector, the ebaicity of  ubstitution  between  imports  dinguished
by source, also by sector, the elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic  consmption of each good (the compones  of which are, in uns,
compositus  of domestic  and  imporled  production);  and  the elsicity  of transformadon  of domoesic  production  into  does  tic uss and  export.
'sMes  remarks  should  not bo  interprcted  as denying  the value of any new empirical  work on gnerting  such elasdcities.  On the contrary,
any effort  that could  generate  better  boundson the e point estimats i  eful in generating  policy concluson that carry greater  credibility,  even
if those  conclusions  will  sill be probabilistic  i  nature.
10fruits  and  vegetables,  whlch  are  expected  to  experience  export  price  lncreasoe,
lt  is  typleally  not  transparent  in  models  of  thli  type  for  the  followlng  reason.
Let  a  denote  the  supply  elasticity  of  the  composite  output  ln  a sector  and
j  denote  the elastlclty  of transformatlon  between  domestlc  and exported  output
ln  a  sector.  Abstractlng  from  general  equlilbrlum  effects  from  other  markets,  de
Halo and  Tarr 119921  show  that lf  and  only if a >  ja,  an lncrease  ln the  export
prlce  wlll  lncrease  output  of  the  domestic  variety  and  ralse  the  domentlc  prlce,
l.e.,  the lmport  and domestlc  varletles  are  gross complements  3.n  production."
Although a  slmilar condition exlits in  consumption,  all  elasticlties in
consumption  are entered  parametrically,  and lt li straightforward  to examlne
whether  the import  and domestlc  varletles  are  gross substltutes.1 2 Although  jo
li entered  parametrically,  a  (the industrywlde  elasticity  of supply) is only
defined  lmplicitly  and,  ln a  model  with  constant  returns  to scale  such  as ours,
could  potentially  assume  extremely  large  values,  especially  for small  sectors
where  output  expansion  will not significantly  alter  the relative  costs  of its
inputs.
we  report our basic results for the cases of  low, medium and high
industrywide  elasticities  of supply.  We implement  a  change  in  the  elasticity  of
supply,  by assumlng  three  different  shares  of  sector  speciflc  capital  ln  all  the
resource (R)  sectors:  50, 75 and 90 percent.  Cotarua  parlbus,  the larger  the
share  of capital  that  is  sector  specific,  the  lower  the  industrywide  elasticity
of  supply.  Appendix  C  numerically  elaborates  the  relationship  between  the  assumed
share  of sector-specific  capltal  ln the cltrus  anO  vegetable  sectors,  and the
Itibe intuion for  ths result as  foliow. When  th export  pric increa_s,  fim tovouer wil  incae  if output  levels  a  held  con
Frms  will  therfor puhase more  Iu  In  order  to  produce  mom.  DEigarding  th relativo  pice chag  betwen  domec and  export  makt
for a moment,  this wald res  In an inoae  In conpoolt pducton,  I.e., of goods  desind for  both  tbe domesic  and expost  murke.  li
increae  In comoste  uput we  label  the  output  effect.  The  extent  of ths  effet  depend  on  e. It i equivalt  to the  Income  effect  in consumer
theory.  Thero  is also  a tansformaton  effect,  however,  my from  produciWg  domestie  goods  in favor  of export  production,  due  to the change
in the relative  price  of exports  to domesi vadeties.  The  extet of this trnsfomat  effect  depends  on  , the  tansformation  elastiity,  and
it is equivalent  to the subsiution  effect  in  consumer  theory.  When  e > p, the  output  effect  domin  tho  trformtion  effect,  and  the  goods
are gros complements.
'2da Melo  and  Tarr (1992 show  that a necess  ad  sufficient  codition for  the  price  of the  dometic import  competing  good  in  a sectr
to be a gross  substitute  with  the  import  good  is that  the  price  elstieity  of demand  for  the  composite  Armin  good  is  less  than  the  Anmington
substitution  elatieity.  This  condition  euns  thtth  ubtitutio effect  wil dominate  the  icom  effect  in demand.  A similar  rsult is  dscued
in Rutmt6m  (9M2.
11supply  elasticity  of the  composite  output  for  domestic  firm.  in  these  sectors.
In  the  case  of citrus  fruits,  the  Industrywide  elasticity  of supply  varies  from
about  unity  to 3.5, but takes slightly  lower  values  in the vegetable  sector.
Given that the elasticity  of transformation  (go)  is S in our benchmark,  this
implies  that  exports  and  domestic  outputs  in  these  sectors  are  gross  substitutes.
In the  present  version  of  the  model  we only  have  one  private  household  in
Morocco. It is important  to note, however,  that there are several powerful
theorems in international  trade theory to show that one can effect Pareto-
efficient  reforms  for  multiple  households  providing  there  are  aggregate  (real)
income  gains and one accepts  some weak conditions  on patterns  of demand  and
ownership.1 3 These  results do  nct  rely  on  the  availability of  lump-sum
redistributive  taxes,  nor  do  they  address  the  issue  of  an  optimal  reform  package.
What  they do show is  that  one can  focus  initially  on aggregate  gains  in income
and  welfare,  knowing  that the redistributive  aspects  of the  problem  do have  a
solution  that leaves  each  household  at least  as well  off as before  the reform.
This  is  not  a complete  substitute  for  actually  solvlng  for  the  equity  effects  of
a  reform  package,  but  it is  a partial  substitute.
The  SOB model  is  generated  with  the  GAMS  software  developed  by  Brooke,
Kendrick  and  Meeraus [19881  and solved  with the MPS/GE  software  developed  by
Rutherford  (19891.  The  systematic  sensitivity  analyses  are  undertaken  with the
ZPSS  software  developed  by  Harrison  (19901  and  using  the  procedures  developed  by
Harrison  and  Vinod 119923.
3. RBSULTS
The policy simulations  that we consider  and the aggregate results  on
welfare  and  taxes  are  summarized  in  table  2,  and  the  employment  effects  by sector
are  summarized  in  table  3.  In  the following  section,  we present  the  results  of
systematic  sensitivity  analysis  to determine  the robustness  of the results  to
a Sc Dixit  and  Norman  (1980;  pp.79/801119861.  The  conditons  on  demad  d factor  ownerahip  pa  a pdmaily  to nde opure
exchange' economies.  7Tea  conditios are  tivialy  met in  our model.
12parameter  specificption.  One parameter  which  stands  out in  importance  regarding
some  of  the  results  in  the  industry-wide  elasticity  of  supply  assumed  in  the
resource  sectors.  Consequently,  ln this section,  we present  our "best  guess"
estimates under  three  different assumptions  regarding  the  lndustry-wlde
elasticity  of supply  in  resource  sectors.
3.1  Welfare,  Revenue  and Aggregate  Primary  Factor  Movement
The  first  three  columns  of  table  2  show  the  welfare  gain  measured  as  the
Equivalent  Variation  as  a  percent  of  benchmark  GDP.  Columns  7-9 show the
percentage  labor  adjustment  measured  by  the necessary  reallocation  of labor
across  sectors  as a percentage  of total  labor  supply.  Columns  10-12 likewise
measure  the  necessary  reallocation  of capital  across  sectors  as a  percentage  of
total  capital  supply.
The  results  depend  on  the  industrywide  elasticity  of supply  assumed  in  the
resource sectors. The greater the elastlcity  of supply, the more resource
movement  across  sectors  (more  labor  has  to change  jobs),  but the  more welfare
gain  as  well.  For  example,  under  ACCESS,  the  cLtrus  fruits  and  vegetables  sectors
obtain  higher  EC prices.  With larger  elasticity  of supply,  they expand  output
more.  ThLs  results  in  greater  welfare  gain  to  the  economy,  but  also  more  movement
of  capital  and  labor  between  sectors.  Conversely,  the  meat  and  dairy,  sugar,  and
cereal  producers  will  suffer  a  decline  in  demand  as  a  result  of lowerlng  tariffs
under  all  scenarios  except  ACCESS.  The  greater  the  elasticlty  of  supply,  the  more
output,  labor and capital  reduction  there will be in these sectors,  but the
larger  the welfare gain as a result of shlftlng  these resources into more
efficient  sectors.4 All the  results  of columns  1-3,  .7-9  and  10-12  follow  thls
pattern.
'"Th  different  elsticities of supply re implemented  through  varying the  are of  ector specific  capiwl. Given ector  ecific capital,  in
reponse to a change  in demand,  the rent on capital  in the sector will cbanp which implies  there will be less movement  of  tsource in or out
of the sctor.  For example,  specific capital  owners  in citrus fruits and vegetables  ear  greater ren  under ACCESS,  but the increase in their
rens increaes their pnces and dininishe the expansionofoutput.  Convesey, in contmcting ectors, ector  pecific  capital  rsults in  a eduction
of ren,  coss  and prices,  and a diminished  reductioa  in output.
13Table  2: Free  Trade  Agreement  with the  EC and  Related  Trade  LLberalizations
Welfare,  Tax and  Factor  Adjustment  Effects  on  Morocco'
________  % Chango  in Welfare  %Cbango  in VAT  e  X  of bbor that hange  jobs  *  of capital t  adjua
H  M  L  H  M  L  H  M  L  M  MN  H
FrA  2.2S  1.52  1.20  54.0  583  60.3  3.2  2.S  2.2  5.1  3.3  2.7
EC81  2.05  1.29  0.97  54.6  5dS9  60.9  33  2.6  2.3  5.4  3.6  3.0
ACCESS  0.31  0.27  0.25  -1.8  -1.2  -1.0  0.4  03  0.3  0.6  0.4  0.3
LIBROW  1.86  1.10  0.78  55.7  60.1  62.0  3.2  2.5  2.2  5.3  3.5  2.9
LIBALL  3.12  2.37  2.06  80.7  8S.5  87.7  3.7  3.0  2.8  6.0  4.3  3.6
FIAALL  336  2.60  2.29  80.0  84.9  87.1  3.6  3.0  2.7  5.6  3.9  3.3
a.  All  aslmlations  use  tho Value-Added  Tax as replcement tx.  Reult  amt  for high (H), medium  @4), and  low (L) elatcity  of supply  in rceource
ecton.
DESCRTION OF POLICIES:
FrA  ...  FuU  free trade agreement  with the EC.  Inmreaed  expost  price for chtra  fmuit  ad  vegtables for SC deintion  by 8 percent, dimination
of inpost proetion  from EC sources.
ECLIB ...  Eimination of impont  protection  againt  C import.
ACCESS ...  Incraed  expont  pries  for citms fiuits  nd vegetable to EC deations  by 8 porco.
LIBROW ...  Emiation  of impost  protection  against  non-BC  impots.
LIALL  ...  Eliminaon of impost protcwtion  against  all imports,  BC and  n-BC.
FTIAALL  ...  Ful free trade agreemt  with the  BC, augmened  by elImiation of impost  proteon  from non-SC su.  as weU.
Flrst  conelder  the  pollcy  scenario  ACCESS.  Improved  access  to the  EC for
citrus  fruits  and  vegetables  will  lmprove  Moroccan  welfare  by  slightly  more  than
one-fourth  of a percent  of GDP,  due  to improved  resource  allocation  and  better
terms-of-trade  in  cltrus  fruits  and  vegetables.  Since  columns  seven  through  nine
show  that factor  movement  is small  under  ACCESS,  It is  primarily  the  terms-of-
trade  improvement  that is provldlng  the benefits  from  improved  access.
Removing  tariffs  against  EC imports  (ECLIB)  results  ln an improvement  in
Moroccan  welfare  of between  one  and  two  percent,  which  is  about  4 to 7  times  the
benefits  of  lmproved  access  alone.  The  free  trade  agreement  (FTA),  which  combines
the  polLcies  of ACCESS  and  ECLIB,  results  in galns  ln  Moroccan  welfare  that  are
14roughly  additive  in  the  separate  policies.  Removing  tariffs  against  the  non-EC
rest of the  world (LIBROW)  results  in !jains  of about  80 percent  of those from
liberalizing  trade  with  the  EC alone,  reflective  of the  fact  that  the EC is  the
larger  trade  partner.
If tariffs  are lowered  against  all imports  (LIBJLL)  another  substantial
increase  in  Moroccan  welfare  (of  about  one  percent  of  GDP)  is  obtained  (compared
with ECLIB),  interestingly,  without  significantly  additional  shifting  of labor
and capital  among  sectors.  The reason  that  the additional  welfare  is obtained
with little  additional  resource  movement  is  that lowering  tariffs  against  only
the  EC induces  resource  movement,  but  that  resource  moveme"t  is  not  necessarily
toward the most efficient  sectors  by world standards,  i.e., there is trade
diversion  from  the  Morocco-EC  Free  Trade  Agreement.0  Resource  movement  that is
induced  by trade diversion  will not occur when tariffs are lowered to all
supplying  countries.  The significant  benefits  that accrue  from  discrim&.natory
liberalization  against  either  EC or rest  of world imports  indicates,  however,
that trade  diversion  is  not dominant.
Liberalizing  tariffs  to the  rest  of the  world  in combination  with a free
trade  agreement  (FTAALL)  with  the  BC  results  in  benefits  that  are  roughly
additive  in  the  separate  poll3ies  that  make  up  FTAALL, i.e.,  LIBALL plus  ACCESS.
All  simulations  are  performed  assuming  that  the  rate  of  VAT  taxation  would
be altered so that revenue to the government  is unchanged.  For  scenarios
involving  reduced  tariffs  against  the EC,  columns  4-6  of table  2 show  that  the
VAT would  have  to be increased  by about  55-60  percent.  This  means  that the  VAT
collection  rate  on imports  would  rise  to about  16-17  percent  (from  the  collected
11  percent)  and  on domestic  products  to about  4-5  percent  (from  the collected  3
percent).  For scenarios involving full tariff liberalization  against all
imports,  the  VAT rate  would  have  to rise  by about  80-90  percent.
"Trade  diverson  would  occur  In  a Moroccan  Fre Trade  Ageentni with  the  BC,  when  a cupper  outside  the  SC would  spply the  product
to Morocco  at a cheaper  price  than  the EC  suppier,  but  the  baff incluJvN  price  of the DC  supplier  is chae.  Ttade  diversion  coss ae more
likely  to be high  relative  to trade  ceation  benefits:  (1)  the  higher  the  tariff  rcte ginst  and  M)  the lager the  are of trde with  the countries
that  are  excluded  from  the  integation  agreement.  We  alo show  in ection  4.1  tt  (3)  the  lower  elascticity  of  mbution of  composite  impott
ad  (4)  the  higher  the  elsicity of substitution  for  imports  fron differeot  counties  of origin,  the  grea  the relte  cost of trade  diversion.
15To sum up the aggregate  effects,  there are significant  trade diversion
costs when only partially liberalizing  import protection,  implying that a
complete  elimination  of the protective  system  would result in higher  welfare
gains than a free-trade  agreement  with the EC. horeover, tnmere  is a clear
correlation  between  the  welfare  effects  and  the  necessary  factor  adjustments.  The
higher  the welfare  gain, the higher  is generally  the adjustment  needed.  One
interesting  conclusion  is that broader trade liberalization  yields greater
welfare  gain  than  the  FTA,  but  with  only  slightly  higher  adjustment  costs.  This
can be seen as an important  argument  in favor  of the efforts  towards  lowering
tariffs  against  non-EC  sources  subsequent  to achieving  a PTA. Finally,  welfare
benefits of 1.5 to 2.5 of GDP, from the free trade agreement or broader
liberalization,  is  quite  substantial  for  models  with  constant  returns  to scale.
We have  shown,  however,  that  a  considerable  portion  of  the  benefits  derives  from
eliminating  dispersion  in  the tariff  regime,  since  dispersion  is eliminated  in
the process of liberallsation.16
3.3  Employment  Impact  by  Sector
The  sectoral  employment  adjustments  occasioned  by the  policies  are  depicted
in  table  3. By  far  the  sector  that  gains  the  most  from  the  trade  liberalization
scenarios  is  the  phosphate  sector,  where  employment  increases  by  over  60  percent.
Despite  the  fact  that  phosphate  exporters  do not  obtain  improved  terms  of  trade
on world markets from the free trade agreement,  the  reduction  of tariffs
depreciates  the  real  exchange  rate  in  Morocco,  and  allows  them  to obtain  more in
domestic  currency  for  their  exports  even  if  the  price  of  their  exports  in  foreign
currency is unchanged.  1 7 Citrus fruits, vegetables and  leather goods  (all
significant  exporters)  are  the  other  industries  that  expand  the  most.
'lia hct, when  we  fis  humonied aiffs  for  al  uen  to dir  weightd  avenge evel  in  the bmmnuk C1IJ pero)  ad  basquweny
simuted dh vaious poliies of shown  in tble 2 (in the  maum  ldticty  sco)  we obtined  considerably  maer  benfits.  m  potular,
tse welfae  benefits  a a peecenge of GDP  ae as follows:  FA,  0549; BCLE, 0325; ACCESS,  0.243;  UBROW,  0290; U3BALI,  1.233;
FrAALL,  1.456.  Thi shows  that  about  two4-id  of the  benofits  in many  of the  sdos  deives from  ha_monzation  of the  tuaf  regime.
"Formlly  speaking  (since  there  is  no money  in  the model,  the price  of expots buys  more  in terms  of domest nontraded  goods.
16Conversely,  since  the cost of the imported  goods  rises in tnrms  of non-
traded  goods,  sectors  which  are  primarily  non-traded  generally  lose  employment
after  the  PTA  or other  liberalizing  scenarios.  The  largest  losers  of  employment,
however,  are  the  agricultural  sectors  that  lower  tariffs  significantly  (cereals,
meat and  dairy  and  sugar).  For  reasons  mentioned  above,  we treat  two sectors  in
the model as homogeneoust  meat and dairy, and sugar. In these sectors the
industry-wide  elasticity of  supply play. an especially important role in
determining  the  decline  in  employment.  The  elasticity  of supply  in  these  sectors
is  controlled  by  the  share  of  sector  specific  capital.  More  precise  estimates  for
these  sectors  could  be  obtained  if  econometrically  estimated  supply  elasticities
were  available.  The  estimates  for  these  sectors  are  illustrative,  given  our  best
guess  of the supply  elasticities.
17Table  3,  Percent  Employment  Change  by  Sector  and  Scenario  *  I
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184.  INACT OP KU PAPAIW_U AND  SUSITIVITY  ANALYSIS
4.1  Impact  of  Key  Parameters
Sensitivity  analysis  over the parameters  of our model has revealed  the
parameters  which  are  most important  regarding  the welfare,  revenue  and factor
adjustment  estimates.  One  which  we  discussed  above  is  the  industrywide  elasticity
of supply.  We have  also found  that  the  results  are  sensitive  to the  elasticity
between  imports  and domestic  consumption  (the  Armington  elautLeity),  and to a
looser  extent  the  elasticLty  of substitution  in  consumption  between  imports  from
the  EC and  the  ROW.  in  this  section  we  discuss  the impact  of  these  parameters  as
well  as  the  Armington  assumption  in  sectors  with  small  inLtial  shares  of  imports.
Elasticity  between  Domestic  Consumotion  and  Comoosite  Imoorts
In  the  results  repirted  in  table  2,  the  Armington  elasticity  is  equal  to
2  for  all  sectors  other  than  sugar  and  meat  and  dairy  (imports  and  domestic
production  are  assumed  to  be  perfect  substitutes  in  these  latter  two sectors).
Increasing  the  Armington  elasticity  for  all  Armington  sectors  increases  the
welfare  benefits,  as  shown  in  table  A2.  At  a  value  of  10  for  the  Armington
elasticity,  the  welfare  benefits  of  the  integration-lLberalization  strategies
increase  more  than  3 times  in  all  scenario.  except  ACCBSS (where  trade  diversion
is  not  an  issue).  At  a  value  of  1 for  the  Armington  elasticity  the  welfare
benefits  are  reduced.
In figure  1  we provide  an interpretation  of the  welfare  economics  of why
an increase  in  the  Armington  elasticity  increases  the  welfare  benefits  of  trade
integration.  To  simplify,  and  to  isolate  the  impact  of  the  Armington  elasticity,
we assume  that  imports  from  EC  and  ROw  sources  are  homogeneous  in  the  preferences
of  consumers.  (In  figure  2 we  show  how  to  generalize  the  graphical  interpretation
to where imports  from  different  sources  are imperfect  substitutes,  as in our
model.)  The case  of trade  diversion  in a given  sector  is depicted.  Tariffs  are
lowered  preferentially  against  imports  from  the  SC,  but  imports  from  the  ROW  are
the  cheapest.  The  cost  advantage  of  ROW  suppliers  is  not  large  enough  to  overcome
the tariff  preference  toward  the  EC,  so that  Moroccan  importers  shift  from  all
ROW imports  to all EC imports.  Initially  equilibrium  is at El and shifts  to
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The trade diversion case, where consumers  regard imports from different sources
as homogenenous,  is pictured. If tariffs are eliminated preferentially against the EC,
the welfare change  is equal to: A - T with D, (inelastic demand  for imports), or A  +  B - T
with D. (elastic demand  for imports). In the trade creation case there is no area T to
subtract, and the triangles A and B extend down to the price of the low cost supplier.either  El  or  ER  dependlng  on the  elasticity  of  demand  for  composite  imports.
Ceterus  parLbus,  the  laxger  the  Amington  lasti.city,  the  larger  the  elasticity
of demand for  composite  imports.  Consumers,  surplus analysis (our general
equilibrium  model  uses  'UcksLan  equlvalent  variation)  implies  that  the  net  change
in welfare  is  equal  to  A - T  in  the  inelastic  case,  or A +  B - T in the  elastic
demand  case,  i.e.,  the  triangle  B representu  the net  difference  in the  welfare
between  the  elastic  and  inelastic  demand  cases.  In the  oauo  of trade  creation,
there  is  no rectangle  T  to subtract  and  the  triangles  A and  B  extend  down  to  the
delivered  price  of the  low  cost  supplier;  but  an  enlarged  triangle  B  remains  the
net  difference  in  welfare  between  the  elastic  and inelastic  demand  cases.
ElastLcity  of Substitution  betweo  i  Imports  fro-  Different  sources
Our benchmark  value  of the  elasticity  of demand  between  imports  from  the
EC and  imports  from  the  ROW  is  S.  In  table  A2,  we show  that increase.ng  this  value
reduces  the  welfare  benefits  of  preferential  tariff  reduction,  either  against  the
SC  or against  the  ROW.  This  parameter  has  no effect  on the  welfare  effects  when
the  tariff  changes  are  not  preferential.
Figure  2 depicts  how an  increase  in  the  elasticity  of  substitution  among
imports  impacts  on the  estimates  of  the  change  in  welfare.  The  demand  curves  of
Moroccan  consumers  for  imports  from  the  SC and from  the ROW are drawn  to show
that  they depend  on their  own price  and among  other prices,  most notably  the
price  of the import  substitute  (in  all cases  it is the  tariff  inclusive  price
that  is relevant).  Preferential  tariff  reduction  against  EC imports  will  reduce
the  tariff  inclusive  price  of EC imports,  and  therefore  induce  an inward  shift
in the demand  curve  for imports  from  the  ROW.  The inward  shift  in the demand
curve for imports from the ROW will be larger  the larger  the elasticity  of
substitution  among  imports  from  different  sources.  In  the  market  for  EC imports,
triangle  A is the gain in consumers  surplus  that is not offset  by lost  tariff
revenue. In  the  market  for  ROW imports,  there  is a  loss  of tariff  revenue  equal
to T,  in the low cross-elasticity  case or equal to Ta  +  T2 in the high cross-
20FIGURE  2: Welfare Benefits of Trade  Integration
Decrease  with Greater Substitutability among Imports
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0  If tariffs are eliminated  preferentially  against  the EC,  the welfare  change  is equal  to: A - T,
with D13,  (small  cross-elasticity  of demand  between  EC  and Rest  of World  imports),  or A - T, - T 2
with DO.  (large  cross-elasticity  of demand  between  EC  and Rest  of World  imports).elasticity  case,  that  iL  not  offset  by  a  consumers,  surplus  change.  Thus,  the  nat
change  in  welfare  is  equal  to  A  - T,  or  A - T,  - T1
Homogeneous  or  Armington  Sectors
Since  both  the  sugar  and  the  meat  and  dairy  sectors  have  little  or  no
imports,  we  have,  assumed  that  they  are  homogeneous  sectors  in our  model.  An
alternative  modelling  procedure  would  be  to  assign  a  very  small  amount  of  imports
to  a  sector  that  has  no  imports  and  treat  the  sector  am an  Armington  sector.  In
view  of  the  above  discussion  on  the  impact  of  the  Armington  elasticity,  it  should
be apparent  that  treating  the sector  an a homogeneous  sector  (equivalent  to an
.infinite  Armington  elasticity)  will increase  the  welfare  benefits  of our  trade
integration  scenarios,  i.e.,  the  Armington  assumption  mutes  resource  movement  and
reduces  the  welfare  impact.19  What may be less apparent  is that under the
Armington  assumption,  in  response  to  a  change  in  trade  policy  in  a  given  sector,
resource  movement  and  the  welfare  impact  will  be  quite  small  in sectors  with a
small  import  share  compared  with  sectors  with  a  large  share  of  imports.  For
example,  with  our  point  estimate  Armington  elasticity  (elasticity  of
substitution)  of  2,  a  fifty  percent  decline  in  the  relative  price  of  imports  will
induce  a  100  percent  increase  in  the  ratio  of  imports  to  domestic  sales  iA
consumption.  But  if  imports  were le  than  0.5  percent  of  consumption,  they  will
remain  under  one  percent  after  their  relative  price  reduction,  i.e.,  the  absolute
increase  in  the  import  share  of  consumption  is  lese  than  0.5  percent.  Wlth  the
same  elasticity  of  substitution,  if  a  sector  has  a  significant  initial  share,  the
same  relative  price  reduction  will  result  in  a  much  larger  absolute  increase  in
imports  as a percent  of total consumption  in the sector.  That is, ceterus
'OTe  jurtification  for  the welfar  nalysi  of fi6g  2 b equato(8)  [or  its  ecW cu,  equio  (S".). in  Harberger  (1971).  Habrge
considers  the  cme where  thene  is a change  in  the  tax on good  I (in ourcae leng  the tariff  Udst  C  impns) in the presce  of tues oan
other  goods  in the economy  my  LJods  2,...,n. In our cm,  the most  notable  oher tax b te  ardff  on copting  impot  from  the rt  of the
wodd  ia the  same  ector. Then,  the chnge in  welfare  b the  chnge in scuplus  oan  good  1, plus  th chag  in .uphu on goods  2,...,o, wheo
the latter  is equal  to the tax  In the  other  setor  tim  es the  change  in quantity  In  thonectows,  anmed over  al mcectost.  To simlify figue
2, and  becan the  crosubasion  effect  in deanod  will  be smaller  and  of either  daa  in odr  sectors,  we  have  ignond  sector otuade  of the
directly  competing  import  sector.  Our  quantitative  alysis,  however,  whch  b baed aon  Hicksa equWalt variaton,  icorp  the welfae
changes  fiom  all  goods.
"See  de Melo  and  Tarr (1992,  chapter  2) for  an elborion.
21paribus,  there  is  dramatlcally  lese  resource  movement  (and  consequently  welfare
impact)  in the  case of a small  initial  import  share.
In the  case  of  sugar  and  meat  and  dairy,  it  appears  inappropriate  to  model
these sectors  as Armington  sectors  after quantitative  restraints  are removed,
where the removal  of tariff  equivalents  of even as high as 100  percent would
result in an import share of less than 2  percent.  These sectors have been
protected  by  quantitative  restraints  because  of  the  fear  that  they  would  contract
precipitously.  On the  other  hand,  the  homogenous  product  assumption  will tend  to
result  in excessive  resource  movement  without  the  presence  of specLfic  factors
of production.  Thus, as discussed  in section 3, we have employed  specific
factors in the homogeneous  sectors,  to approximate  the appropriate  supply
response.
4.2 Sensitivity  Analysis
How  robust  are  our  major  policy  conclusions  to  the  many  assumptions  of  our
numerical  model?  We answer  this question  partially  by considering  a systematic
sensitivity  analysis  of  the  main  results  with  respect  to all  of  the  elasticitLes
of the  model.'
our sensitivity  analysis  employs  the  procedures  developed  by  Harrison  and
Vinod (1992).  Essentially  these  procedures  amount  to a  Monte Carlo  simulation
exercise  in  which  a  wide  range  of  elastLcities are  independently and
simultaneously  perturbed  from  their  benchmark  values.  These  perturbations  follow
prescribed  distributions,  such  as  a  t  dLitribution  with  a  specified  standard
deviation  and  degrees  of  freedom,  or  a  uniform  dLstributLon  over  a  specified
range. 21  For  each  Monte  Carlo  run  we solve  the  counter-factual  policy  with the
selected  sit  of elasticitLes.  This process  is repeated  until  we arrive  at the
desired sahple size, in our case 1000.  The results  are then tabulated  as a
distribution,  with  equal  weight  being  given  (by  construction)  to  each  Monte  Carlo
run. The upshot is a probability  distribution  defined over the ondogenous
W. pprciaatha  the  aro  my  otheraetlom  thtat moafixd  weutvay  easci,  butgardthor  exmoemu beyoand
the  mcope  of the  prewnt  study.
2 lbe exact  diotibutional  asumption  used  ae documewed  in Appendix  A.
22variables of interest. In  our case  we focus  solely on the welfare impacts  of each
policy.
TABLE 4: Results from sensitivity analysis
_________  FTA  ACCESS  ECLIB  LIBROW  LIBALL  FTAALL
sample  1005  2284  1096  1002  1002  1078
size  . . . ._._  I
WELFARE  1.52  0.27  1.29  1.10  2.37  2.60
PE  ,  . ,  I
Median  1.72  _  0.29  1.51  1.39  2.73  2.96
Mean  1.74  0.29  1.51  1.39  2.72  2.96
St. d.  0.39  0.02  0.31  0.32  0.35  0.35
Prob>O  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
Prob>PE  0.705  0.789  0.721  0.870  0.809  0.826
50% LB  1.49  0.28  1.27  1.11  2.43  2.69
50% UB  2.00  0.31  1.77  1.64  2.96  3.23
75% LB  1.38  0.27  1.14  1.00  2.26  2.52
75% UB  2.14  0.32  1.90  1.79  3.12  3.40
VAT rate  58.3  -1.20  58.90  60.10  85.50  84.90
PE
Median  56.33  -1.55  57.08  57.11  81.69  80.99
Mean  56.39  -1.58  57.11  57.25  81.75  81.01
St.d.  2.95  0.03  3.07  3.24  3.13  3.07
Prob>0  1.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
Prob>PE  0.262  0.086  0.297  0.197  0.133  0.129
50% LB  54.42  -1.81  54.96  55.06  79.52  78.75
50% UB  58.49  -1.39  59.35  59.63  84.19  83.34
75% LB  53.02  -1.99  53.53  53.72  78.11  77.32
75% UB  59.90  -1.29  60.60  61.55  85.70  85.00
LABOR  2.4  0.3  2.5  2.5  3.0  2.9
ADJ PE  I  a_  _
Median  2.65  0.32  2.75  2.77  3.48  3.38
Mean  2.67  0.32  2.78  2.80  3.49  3.39
St.d.  0.36  0.04  0.38  0.39  0.48  0.45
PE - point estimate, st.d. - standard deviation, LB - lower bound, US
- upper bound
23The results  of the sensitivity  analysis  are reported  in Table 4. In  the
interests  of  reporting  all  of  the  pertinent  data  in  a  compact  manner,  some  of  the
column  and row headings  are necessarily  uome4hat  cryptic  at first  glance.  The
acronyms  for each simulation  (column  headlng)  are defined in Figure 1. The
"Sample  Size"  row refers  to the  number  of Monte  Carlo  runs that were actually
completed.  In each case  we have  at least  1000  runs,  whlch should  be enough  to
obtain  a  reliable  picture  of the  dlstribution  of results.  The "Point  Estimate*
(PR)  row shows  the effect  of the  policy  when  all elasticities  are set  equal  to
their  benchmark,  or  point  estimate  (PS),  values.  These  are  the  results  reported
.and  discussed  earlier.  As before,  we report  the change in welfare  due to the
policy  as a percent  of GDP,  the  revenue  as  the  change  in  the  VAT  rate  required,
and  the labor  adjustment  as  the  percent  of  the  labor  force  that is  reallocated.
The  remaining  rows  report  the  results  of  the  sensitivity  analysis  proper.
We list  the  median,  the  mean,  and  the  standard  deviation,  so  as  to  provide  simple
indicators  of the  location  and  dispersion  of  the  distribution  of results.  We do
not  report  here  the skewness  and  kurtosis  statistics  that are  necessary  to  gain
a  more complete  impression  of the  distribution.  In all  cases  we find  that  both
the  skewness  and kurtosis  are  insignificant.
In order to obtain an indication  of the qualitative  policy results  we
report  the  "Prob.  2 0"  row  for  the  welfare  and  the  VAT  rate  results,  which  shows
the probability  from the empirical  distribution  that welfare  increased  in the
counter-factual  policy.  This gives  us a  measure  of the confldence  that  we have
the  sign  right  when  we look  at the  Point  ZstLmate  effect  or the  Mean  or Median.
Similarly,  we report  a row  showing  the  probability  that an effect  greater  than
or equal to  the  PE effect was obtained. If the PR  result is perfectly
representative  of the  location  of  the  dLstribution  of  results  we should  see  this
value  around  one-half;  this  would  be the  case  if the  PE  result  exactly  equalled
the  reported  Median  result.  A value  lower  (higher)  than  one-half  indicates  that
the  distribution  generally  lies  below  (above)  the  PE result.A
bWdh  the  excepdon  of the itenediate input  subibdzion,  where  the  point  eanmte is  0.
24Flnally,  to  galn  a  better  sense  of  the  confldence  to be attached  to  the  PR
or  Mean  welfare  and  VAT rate  result,  we  report  lower  and  upper  bounds  from  50%
and  75%  symmetrlc  confldence  lntervals  around  the  Median  result.  Theme  confldence
lntervals  simply  show  the  smallest  and  largest  values  that  1Le  wlthin  50%  or  75%
of the dLitribution  centered  on the Medlan.  Thus a 50% confidence  interval
between  1.1  and  2.3  can  be  Laterpreted  as  saying  that  50%  of  the  Monte  Carlo  runs
resulted  ln  welfare  results  between  these  values.
What, then, do we learn from these sensLtLvity  analyse.  regardlng  our
pollcy  conclusLons?  Most mean and median  welfare  effects  are above  the point
estimates  reported  earlier.  These  hLgher  welfare  effects  are  also coupled  wlth
higher  adjustment  costs.  We can conflrm our conclusLon  above that PTA is a
preferred  policy  package  to  BCLIB  ln  the  sense  of  provldlng  hlgher  median  welfare
galne at lower  median  adjustment  costs.  Note, however,  that the mean welfare
effect  for  ECLIB  lies  wlthln  one  standard  deviatlon  of the  mean for  FTA.  There
ie  therefore  considerable  overlap  between  the  two  distributions  so  the  concluslon
regardLng  whlch  pollcy  package  is  preferred  might  stlll  not  be  robust.  We flnd,
however,  that  the  welfare  effect  ln  PTA is  greater  then  the  medlan  welfare  effect
in  ECLID  with  a  probabillty  of  0.711.  The  reverse  case  that  the  welfare  effect
ln ECLIB  Li larger  than  the  medlan  welfare  effect  in  PTA  only  occurs  with  a
probabillty  of  0.282,  however.
Similarly,  we  flnd  the  second-best  argument  ln favor  of  elimLnatLng  all
import  protection  and  not  just  protectLon  from  EC competitlon  to  be  robust  to
varLatLons  ln  the  value  of  key  parameters.  The  welfare  effect  in  LIBALL is  much
larger  than  the  welfare  effect  of  ECLIB,  but  wlth  not  much  additlonal  labor
adjustment.
InterestLngly  we flnd  that  the  median  revenue  effects  are  smaller  than  the
poLnt  estimates.  In  no  case  would  the  VAT rate  have  to  increase  to  more  than
about  5  5  and  20  percent  from  a  benchmark  value  of  3  and  11  percent  for
domestically  produced  and  lmported  goods,  respectively.
In  summary,  we  flnd  that  our  general  conclusions  are  quite  robust  with
respect  to  any  uncertainty  ln  key  parameters.  Welfare  and  labor  adjustments  tend
25to be higher,  due to the inclusion  of higher  Armington  elasticities,  but the
revenue  effect  is smaller.
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27APPENDICES  TO








A.l. Choice  of  Point-Estimates
In all sectors,  the elasticity  of transformation  (between  output for
domestic  and export  markets)  i  set at 5 and the transformation  elasticity
(between  exports  for  the  EC and  non-SC  markets)  is  met  at 8.  The  elasticity  of
substitution  between  domestic  and  imported  goods  (the  Armington  elasticity)  is
set  equal  to 2 across  all  sectors,  and  the  substitution  elasticity  between  BC and
non-SC  imports is  set at 5.'  Effects  due to the choice  of  values  of  these
parameters  are  traced  out  in  the  next  section.  Detailed  estimates  of the
Armington  elasticities  for  the  ORANI  model  of  Australia  are  reported  in  DLxon,
Parmenter,  Sutton,  and  Vincent  (19821,  ranging from 0.34 for oil  and  coal
products  to  6.8  for  footwear,  however  the  majorLty  of sectors  receive  a value  of
2.  LackLng  more  specific  informatLon  about  substitutablilty  Ln Morocco,  we  not
thli elasticity  to 2 for  all  sectors,  but  trace  out  the  effects  from  variations
in  its  value  in  the  next  section.  The  consumer's  *top  level"  elasticity  of  demand
for  composite  output  of  the  sector  is  taken  to  be  one  for  all  sectors.  Given  that
this value,  whlch  does not  vary in  the sensitivity  analysis,  is le  than the
Armington  elasticity,  imports  and  domestic  goods  wlthln  a  sector  may  be expected
to be gross  substltutes.
The prlmary  factor  substitutlon  elastLeLties  are based on the detailed
regression  estimates  of Harrison,  Jones, Kimbell,  and Wlgle (19911,  and are
lLsted  ln Table  Al as they  apply  here.  They range  from 0.43  for  OIL  up to 1.99
for  servlces  sectors  (CON,  COX,  SRV,  and  ADM),  but  the  vast  majority  are  close
'the  systeat  wutvty  analysis  Investiga varations  in  de  easIciaes  bsed On  uwIfom  dlibuoa  wich have  the  fowinU  rang:
between  2.5  and  735  for  the  asfonnon  elksticit  between  dometc ad foreign  mzout betwen  6.5  d 9.5  brdb  trfonnationelaic
between  foreign  outputs  of differerA  destinations;  between  0.5 ad 3.S for  th  A  DMon  elsicity between  impots ad dometic  ouput;  ad
between  2.5 and  7.5 for the  Annington  elsicity for  impons  from  difhren  omus.TABLE Al:  Capital-Labor  Substitution  elasticities
Scctor  In Morocco  model  Sector in H J K W  Points dmait  Standard  deviaton
CER  20  0.95  0.04
suo  20  0.95  0.04
Clr  20  0.95  0.04
VEG  20  0.95  0.04
MAD  20  0.9S  0.04
FSH  20  0.95  0.04
FOR  20  0.95  0.04
FOO  20  0.95  0.04
BEV  20  0.95  0.04
OFP  20  0.95  0.04
PHS  14  0.43  0.11
NMM  24  0.43  0.11
MIN  14  0.43  0.11
CAO  14  0.43  0.11
OIL  13  0.43  0.09
usE  B  1.88  0.25
TX_  22  0.93  0.08
CLO  23  1.19  0.03
LEA  31  0.75  0.16
WDN  24, 25  0.93  0.10
PAP  26,27  1.00  0.13
CEM  32  0.96  0.13
LAS  33  0.91  0.24
T_Q  35  1.20  0.09
EEQ  36  0.98  0.03
IND  35  1.20  0.09
MAC  35  1.20  0.09
EMI  39  1.19  0.05
CHM  28  1.01  0.03
RBR  30  0.97  0.08
OTH  39  1.19  0.05
TRD  C, D  1.28  0.53
TRN  B  1.88  0.25
BNK  E  2.06  0.25
INS  B  2.06  0.25
CON  Nonitded  1.99  0.48
COM  Nonraded  1.99  0.  I
SRV  Nontided  1.99  0.48
ADM  Nontaded  1.99  0.48
Source:  Harrison,  Jones, Kimbell,  WVigb  11992M.
A-3to unity.
In addition  there is an elasticity  of substitution  between intermediate
inputs  and  value-added  in each sector.  The  tradition,  no doubt  born of Input-
Output  modelling  habits,  is  to set  this  elasticity  at zero.  We do likewise,  but
also consider values of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1  (for each sector) in our
censitivity  analysis.
A.2 Effects  of choice  of  trade  elasticities
We trace out the effects on welfare in order to assess the model's
sensitivity  to  the  choice  of  value  of  the  Armington  elasticity  (qA)  between  goods
from domestic  and foreign  nources  and (am)  between  EC and ROW sources.  These
results  are  presen'ed  in Tables  A2.
The  welfare  effects  are-  wry  ssnsitive  to variations  in the substitution
elasticity  between  domostic  and foreign  sources. The welfare  effects  from  the
PTA simulation,  for examples, goes from 1 to 5 percent as the elasticity
increases  from 1  to 10.  With  the exception  of  ACCESS,  the  welfare  effects  are
at  least  quadrupled.  The  sensitivity  with  respect  to  the  elasticity  of
substitution  between  EC and  ROW sources  is not that pronounced.  The table
illustrates,  however,  how  trade  diversion  costs  become  more pronounced  with  the
value  of this elasticity. Again  ACCESS  provides  a slight  exception  due  to the
small  effects  in general.
In  summary,  the  confidence  intervals  provided  by the  sensitivity  analysis
of the main text provide more reliable  estimates  of welfare and adjustment
effects  than  a  point  estimate.  This  is  especially  true  due  to  the  sensitivity  of
the  estimates  to  the  Armington  elasticity,  and  the  uncertainty  regarding  an  exact
point  estimate.
A-4TABLE  A2: Welfare  Effects  of variations  i  elasdcites  of subsitution  in demand
r  FTA  ECLIB  LEBALL  ACCESS  LIBROW  FrAALL
A  1  1.184  0.962  1.814  0.243  0.882  2.035
oA= 2  1.518  1.288  2.369  0.265  1.099  2.598
3  1.859  1.622  2.939  0.285  1.317  3.176
A=  4  2.213  1.970  3.535  0.306  1.541  3.777
A  =  5  2.587  2.338  4.164  0.326  1.775  4.412
oA= 6  2.986  2.732  4.837  0.347  2.024  5.089
cA  =  7  3.419  3.160  S.557  0.368  2.292  5.814
=A  - 8  3.890  3.676  6.323  0.389  2.584  6.584
oA  =  9  4.406  4.137  7.127  0.411  2.905  7.393
^A  =10  4.969  4.695  7.956  0.433  3.260  8.225
44  =  1  2.005  1.774  2.369  0.265  1.652  2.598
arm  2  1.857  1.626  2.369  0.265  1.499  2.598
o4m  =  3  1.723  1.493  2.369  0.265  1.351  2.598
OM =  4  1.610  1.380  |  2.369  0.265  1.216  |  2.598
aM  =  5  1.518  1.288  |  2.369  0.265  1.099  |  2.598
44 =  6  1.448  1.219  2.369  0.265  1.002  2.598
om  = 7  1.398  1.169  2.369  0.265  0.927  2.598
aM  =  8  1.365  1.136  2.369  0.265  0.871  2.598
OM  =  9  1.346  1.117  2.369  0.265  0.832  2.598
OM =  10  1.339  1.110  2.369  0.265  0.809  2.598
Table  value repre  the  change  In welfare  (equivaen  variation) a  * peenta  of 3DP.  See  table  2 for an explation of the
policies.
-A th-e  A_nn  oluaicity  of sbsitution between  do_nic  out  ad compoaite  iwpofs.  am - the  elasiciy of subtton
between  imports  fonm  different  sourees.
Souce: Model  enmate.
A-5APPlDZZ  3
adjustments  to  the  Social  Accounting  Matrix
- 5Thi apperndl  documents  the  adjustments  to  the BAN required  to  benchmark
the  Moroccan  503  sodel,  and  the  extraneous  data  incorporated.  The original  B1W
ix explained  in  Matous  et  al.  (19881.
The  1980  SAM  cousnsts  of  39  sectors,  and  all  are  retained  in  the  SO  model.
14  labor  accounts  are  aggregated  into  one.  Throe  capital  accoua-s  are  aggregatod
into one. One  prlvate  representatLve  household  owns  both of these aggregated
production  factors,  and  any  ownership  by  the  governmoet  and  the  enterprise  sector
has been transferred  into tho privato  household.  Final  demad  by four  "true
households"  aro  aggregated  Lnto  this  private  representative  household.  gove-zatmnt
demand  is  only  for  sector  Administration  (the  public  sector).
The  vector  called  "endow"  shows  consumption  of citizens  living  abroad.  We
show  thLs  as exports  by the  bankLng  sector.  The  tourist  account  (consumption  by
tourists  in Morocco)  is similarly  incorporated  into  exports.
Several  input  taxes  are  levied  in  production.  The value-added  tax  is  levied
on both capital  and labor  as  well as imports  of all  goods,  the social-security
tax only on labor,  and the  corporate  tax  only  on capitatl.  These  taxes are  all
calculated  not  of  any subsidies.  There  is also  a  production  subsidy  (not  of the
excise  tax)  on output.  All  these  taxes  show some  variation  in collection  rates
in the  SAM.  Lacking  more  detailed  information  regarding  existing  exemptions  and
variations  in  tax  collections  across  sectors  wv assume  that  collection  rates  are
the  uniform  across  sectors  for  these  taxes,  however.  Therefore  we  are  able  to
isolate  resource  allocation  effects  that  derive  from  distortions  due  to  trade
restrictions (assuming that  trade  taxes  do  not  offset  other  sectoral
differentials).  The income  tax is only about  3% and  is  therefore  excluded  for
simplicity.
As the SAM is constructed  based on data  from  1980,  before  the  major
liberalisations  were  undertaken,  we  considered  it  important  to  establish  whether
the  structure  of  the  economy  had  changed  dramatically  between  1980  and  1991.
A-6TABLE  B1: Comparison  of value-added  in 1980  and 1991
Aggregated  sector  1980  SAM  share  1991  share
Agriculture  20.1  24.0
Mining  4.8  2.4
Coal  and Oil  0.2  0.2
Refined  Oil  0.2  4.6
Electricity  and  Water  1.7  3.4
Manufacturing  15.9  22.7
Trade  15.2  14.2
Transportation  and  Communication  5.7  7.8
Other  Services  36.2  20.6
,1_______________________________  100.0  99.9
Table  B1 summarizes  a  description  of value-added  shares  in some aggregatCd
sectors  according  to  the  1980  SAN  and  offiLial  value-added  data  for  1991.  As can
be  seen  no  such  dramatic  structural  changes  have  occurred,  so  we  can  retain  our
confidence  in  the results  based  on the 1980  SAM.
We decided  to use 1991  data on tariff  rates  rather  than tariff  revenue
collections  recorded  in  the  1980  SAM.  The  rates  we applied  are  based  on  the  legal
rates  from  World  Bank  "Stntiaw  trade  files  based  on  data  provided  by  the  Moroccan
Ministry  of  External  Commerce,  adjusted  so revenues  match  the 1991  collected
tariff  revenaes.  This adjustment  to match collections  was needed  due to the
number  of exemptions  that exist in tariff collections.  We encountered  som
problems  in the sectoral  mapping  from  the Siatia  data base to the 39 sectoral
level  of  the  SAM.  We  therefore  had  to  turn  to auziliary  data  for  rates  on  sectors
CIT,  FOO  and  MAC. For  all  39  sectors  we applied  the simple  average  of  the  legal
rates  reported  at the most  disaggregated  level  before  adjusting  to collection
rates.
We also  calibrated  the  $iport  and  export  shares  by source  and  destination
A-7country  to  1991  according  to  the  sintia  files.  Again,  due  to  mapping
difficulties,  we  needed  to refer  to  auxiliary  data  14!portf-ctors  CIT,  FOR, PRO,
P00,  WDN, MAC,  anjdexportAuctors  CUR,  BUG,  CAO, POO,  CIV,  3ZN,  3BQ,  MAC, 333,
-as  well  as  exports and  imports for all  services sectors are  therafore
disaggregated  by source  and  destination  country  according  to  the  United  Natlons
database  on Direction  of Trade (the  CONTRAD3  data  base) for 1990.
We decided  against  including  more  detail  in the  model  by identifying  the
Maghreb  and  Other  Arab  countries  as  separate  trading  partners  due  to  their
relatively  small  importance.  The  Maghreb  countries  account  for  3  and  8%
respectively  in  imports  and  exports  and  corresponding  figures  for  Other  Arab
countries  are  10  and  3%.
We  also  decided  to  adjust  the  VAT  rate  to reflect  the  collections  in 1991.
We  therefore  set  the  domestic  rate  to  3%  and  the  rate  on  imports  to 11%.  When  the
VAT rates ara adjusted  to  keep  the  government  budget  balanced  through the
counterfactural  simulations  the  domestic  and  the  imported  rates  are  adjusted  by
the  same  proportion.  Therefore,  as  imported  rates  are  higher  than  domestic  rates
in the benchmark  they will tend to change  by a  larger  number of percentage
points. This reflects the differences in exeaptions  between imported and
domestically  produced commodities.  Finallv,  the corporation  tax  (levied  on
capital  use)  of 5  percent  reflects  the  collected  rate in 1991.
A-8AmPmEIX C
nh  Relationship  Betweon  the  Blastcity  of  Supply
and  the  Sector-specific  Capital  Ibare
This appendlx  numerlcally  establishes  the  relatLonshLp  between  the share
of sector-specific  capital in the cLtrus frults (CIT) and vegetables  (VKG)
sectors  and  the  industry-wide  elasticity  of  supply La these sectors. Our
numerical  procedure  is  as follows.  We start  wlth  a  value of j,  whlch is the
elasticity  of  transformation  between  output  destined  for  exports  or  the  domestic
market.  This  value  is  given  in the first  column  of table  Cl. We first  confirm
that  the  prices  of  the  domestic  variants  of  CIT  and  VUG  decrease  in  ACCESS  (where
their export prices increase) for a situatlon  where the entire capital st%ck in
each sector is mobile. We then increase  the share of the sector-specific capital
stock  in  the  resource  sectors  in  small  steps  until  we  encounter  a situation  where
the domestic  price  in citrus  fruits  increases  The crltlcal  value  of the  share
of sector  specifLc  capital  where the  export  and  domestLc  varieties  are on the
edge of the gross  complesent-substLtute  relatLonship,  glven  the elasticity  of
transformation  and other parameters  of the model, ls  listed  in column 2. As
discussed  ln the  text,  we may infer  from  the relationship  li de Nelo and Tarr
(19921,  that  at  the  listed  value  of the  share  of sector  specific  capital,  (.  the
elasticity  of  transformatLon  is  approximately  equal  to , industry  elastLclty  of
supply.  With  a  point  estimate  of  the  export  transformatLon  elasticity  of 5.0,  we
would  need  e.  sector  specific  capital  share  of  at least  37.5  percent  to ensure
that  a  gross-substltute  relationshLp  exists  between  export  and  domestLc  varLetles
of  citrus  fruits.  We may  infer  from  table  Cl,  that  (given  all  the  parameters  of
the  model)  if  the  share  of  sector  specific  capital  in  all  resource  sectors  is
92.5  (45)  percent,  then  the  elasticity  of  supply  in  citrus  fruits  ls  about  1  (4).
A-9TABLE Cl:  The Relationship  between  the Supply  Elasticity and the Share of Sector-specific  Capital
Imputed  Elasticity of Supply  Percentage  of sector specific












ALGEBRAIC  FORMULATION  OF TER  MODEL
The  model  is formulated  as a system  of nonlinear  equations  corresponding
to the three  classes  of equilibrium  conditions  associated  with an Arrow-Debreu
general  equilibriums  price-cost  relations  for  producers,  supply-demand  balance
for  commodity  and factor  markets (including  balance  of payments),  and income-
expenditure  balance  for  domestic  consumers  and  government.  In SO  these  models
are  generated  using  the  GAMS  programming  language  and  solved  using  the  modified
Newton  (SLCP)  algorithm  due  to  Mathiesen  (19851.  in  this  framework  a  central  set
of variables (prices,  activity levels and income levels) characterize  the
economic  equilibrium.
All important  notation  is summarized  in Figure  Al.
Technology,  Preferences  and  itarket  Clearance  Conditions
Domestic  production  is  an aggregate  of  domestic  and exported  varieties  with
A-10.. . ,Xe  .,Ctem.esiate  .lnpoztof  good:ki  c¢:*  ~. ......................... 
...  Valaze added  otion  tow  v.  '::''4--'a:tow"
Fiur  A1Lfr  tefo  tNotationtv.doeti  cnum
CapitXl  inut  (o  seto  I  )/'  2
x~ terediteinp~tsof  oo  k  n  A-ll  ~This relationship  can be interpreted  as inplying  differences  in the  technical
processes associated  with production for domestic and export markets. The
elasticity  of transformation  defined  by el  will be lower for goods which are
highly  differentiated  and  higher  for  goods  which  are  relatively  homogeneous.  The
specification  of  this  elasticity  may  be influenced  by  the  intended  time  frame  of
the  analysis.  In  the short-run  it is  more  difficult  to transform  plants  between
domestic  and export  oriented  products.
Imports  from  different  trading  partners  trade  off  with  domestic  varieties
in  intermediate  demand,  investment  demand  and  final  demand.  For  simplicity  (and
due to limitations  of data)  we assume  that the import  composition  and import-
domestic  substitution  possibilities  in  investment,  Intermediate  and  final  demand
are  identical.  Under  these  conditions  we  can  represent  inputs  as  though  they  were
composed of  a  single import-domestic  aggregate for  each  commodity. The
aggregation  of domestic  and,  imported  varieties  is characterized  by a nested
constant-elasticity  function  of domestic  and imported  goods:
Si  a=  (  1/4  (aly  4  im, a(V,IO  (3) -,  *XDgM)  (aDl'  Di '  '  + cAow  Hi')  3
where  X,  represents  a  composite  import  from  two or more  regions  rt
ml ( St J64  Mlr1IS
The market  clearance  condition  for domestic  supply  balances  output from the
Armington  aggregation  function  with  intermediate,  investment  and  final  demand.
This  condition  is:
Si  - an2jXYj  + GI + X, +  *,  (4)
in which  Y,  is the activity  level  of sector  J, a,  is the input  requirements  of
good I  in sector  J, and G,,  I,  and C, are  components  of final  demand  associated
with government,  investment  and final  consumption.
Variable inputs to  production include primary factors as  well  as
intermediate  inputs  of commodities.  These  are  comki.ned  in  a  linearly  homogeneous
nested  Leontief-CES  form:
A-12Yls ~  42  mi[r'^  t  a VA  1(5
where
VI (4)  = ( Sk  56  f'(  )
In this  equation  XB  represents  intermedlate  inputs  of good  k  in sector  I, f2  ig
the  variable  input  of primary  factor  k  in sector  i, V 5(  represent.  the  value-
added function  for variable  factors,  fi  represents  primary factor inputs  to
variable cost in sector  I, and  fr represents  the in'ut of factor  k  to the
formation  of fixed  costs  in  sector  i,  due  to the  possibility  of sector-specific
capital.
Domestic  welfare  is  defined  by consumption  levels  of  market  goods:
Y=U  (Cj,...,  C.)  (6)
The  current  account  is  balanced  at  international  prices  (pf  and ),  taking
into  account  exogenous  capital  flows (B):
Pi X,  + B  u- pim',  (7)
The  prices which  appear in  this equation are  exogenous parameters, the
international  prices  of imports  and  exports.  This constraint  has  an associated
variable  which is the "real  exchange  rate".  The model,  however,  contains  no
monetary  instruments  and  determines  only  relative  prices.  The  exogenous  increase
in the export price that represents  access  to  SC  markets in our model, is
equivalent  to  an  improvement  in  this "real  exchange  rate".
Factor  markets  always  clear  with flexible  prices:
E  fS  + 4f  Ek
Income-Expenditure  Balance
Consumer income includes  primary factor  earnings  plus foreign  capital
inflows  less  transfers.  Final  demand  is  modelled  by  budget-constrained  utility
A-13maximization  by a representative  agent.  The  budget  constraint  is  written:
£ fri C  - 4w5EA  + a  - 'rr  ()
In  this  equation  vk  represents  the  market  price  of  primary  factor  k,  B represents
the foreign  exchange  balance  and  Tr  T  represents  the  level  of lumpsum  transfer.
Unlike  private  households,  government  demands  are held constant  in all
simulations.  The  government  budget  constraint  is  accommodated  through  endogenous
scaling  of one  of the  three  government  tax  instruments  so  that  revenue  balances
with expenditure.  Government  income  consists  of five components:  (i) lumpsum
transfers  from  households  (T),  (il)  import  tariffs  (tu),  (iii)  value-added  taxes
on  factor input. to production and  on  imports (P,),  (iv) employment and
corporation  taxes  on factor  employment  (ta),  (v)  less  production  subsidies  net
of  excise  taxes (at),  (vi)  less  export  subsidies  (sf,).  The  government  budget  is:
,r  G 1 - ?T 2  +  T  avi  tag  4 +  T,  pv wt f4  +  , pi,  tfrmi.r
(10)
sip (pi  Di  + pfX,  )  _  8X  pfX,
in  the  government  budget  equation  parameters  which  endogenously  adjust  to  bala-e
income  and  expenditure  ares  Tr  for  lumpsum  transfers,  r1 for  factor  taxes,  and  i,
for  value-added  taxes.  In  any  given  equilibrium  only  one  of  these  parameters
departs  from  the  default  value  of  unity.
PrIce-Cost  Balance  In  Competitive  Miarkets
When  technology  exhibits  constant  return.  to  scale  producers  price at
marginal  cost.  In  production  the  marginal  cost  of  supply  for  sector  I  (ce)  is
defined  by:
ciY  -,  f1jXfl  + (1 + `rA)  LF,fA  (11)
The competitive  market  structure  with constant  returns  to scale  technology  and
no barriers to entry drives excess profits to zero. Producers  then equate
marginal  cost  with  market  price  gross  of subsidy,  providing  the following  zero
profit  condition:
A-14(1+48) (PI  DI+ PJ  XJ) +,PZ  XI S  - Cl Yi  (12)
In this equation the first term represents  the  value of output gross of
production  subsidy,  and the second  term captures the effect of the export
subsidy.
The  import  aggregation  always  equates  price  with  marginal  cost.  This  means
that  the  value  of  domestic  supply  equals  the  cost  of  domestic  inputs  plus  imports
gross  of tariffs  and rentat
Iris,  . p,D,  + ,(1s+rt,t,)  py  a4  (13)
Model  solver
The model is solved  with the MPS/GE software  developed  by Rutherford
[19891,  and  generated  with  the  GAMS  software  developed  by Brooke,  Kendrick,  and
Meeraus (1988J.  For  the  purposes  of this  model some  modifications  of GAKS have
been  included  allowing  the  specification  of  the  MPS/GE  format  in  an  index  format.
We include  an annotated  version  of this code:
*  MODEL  DEFINITION  IN MPS/GE  VECTOR  SYNTAX
$MODEL:MOROCCO
The  sectors statement lists all the activities  of the model: the utility
aggregator  for  the  consumer  (U),  the  same  for  the  government  (G),  all  production
activities  (Y(I)),  export  activities  (X(I)),  and import  activities  (M(I)).
$SECTORS:
U G NVK  Y(I) X(I)$EXPORT'I)  M(I)$IMPORT(I)  A(I)
The commodities  on the  model include:  a utility  good for  the private  consumer
(PU),  foreign  exchange  that  translates  export  revenues  into  purchasing  power  for
imports  (PFX),  an investment  good (PNVK),  a government  consumption  good (PG),
factors  of production  (PF(F)),  Armington  goods (PA(I)),  domestic  output  goods
(PD(I)),  export  and  import  goods (PE(I)  and  PI(I)).
$CONMODITIES:
PU PFX PNVK  PG PF(F)$E(F)
PA(I)  PD(I)  PE(I)$EXPORT(I)  PI(I)$IMPORT(I)







V:DF(F,I)$DFB(F,)  I:PF(F) PROD:Y(I)
V:DS(I)  I:PD(I) PROD:A(I)
Producers  demand  production  factors  and  Armington  intermediate  good.  and  produce
output for domestic  and export  destinations.  The production  subsidy applies
independent  of destination.  Either the VAT or the FACT  (taxes on  factor
employment)  can  be used an an equal  yield  constraint.
*  AGGREGATE PRODUCTIONs
$PRODsY(I) ttETRNDX(I) atESUBKL(I)
O:PD(I)  Q:DB(I)  P:PYB(I) AsGOVT  T:(-SP(I))
O:PE(I)$EXPORT(I)  Q:XD(I)  P:PYB(I) A:GOVT  Ts(-SP(I))
I:PA(J)  QtIOB(J,I)
I:PF(F)  QsDFB(F,I) PsPFB(F,I)  a:
+  AsGOVT  N:TAU( "VAT") MSVATD(I)
+  NsTAU("F")  M:FACT(F,I)
The  export  variety  of  the  good  can  be  exported  to  different  export  destinations.
The  aggregate  export  good  produced  above  is  the  input  to  this  activity.  Exports
generate  foreign  exchange,  which  quantity  depends  not  only  on  the  quantity  of
exports  but  also  on  the  price  received.  The  transformation  effact  between  export
varieties  to different  destinations  caused  by  a change  in  the  relative  price  of
the varieties  in captured  in the P: field.  The  good with the higher  relative
export price (PX) will tend to become a relatively  cheaper contributor  to
purchases  of foreign  exchange  than  other  goods.  PXB  represents  the  international





+  Ps(PXB(I,XR)/PX(I,XR))  AsGOVT  T:(-SX(I,XR)/(l-SX(I,XR)))
Imports  are  aggregated  with  a  CES function  in  two  step.







I:PFX#(MR) Qs(MB(I,MR)*PM(I,MR))  Pt(PMB(I,MR)/PM(I,MR))
+  A:GOVT  TtT(I,MR)  NtTAU(nVAT")  Ms((l+T(I,MR))*VATX(I))
+  A:REPAGT  TsNTB(I,MR)
The  private  consumer  utility  aggregator  is  a  Cobb-Douglas  function.




A-16The  government  consumption  aggregator  assumes  no  substitutability  between  goods
demanded
*  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTIONs
$PROD  s  G
O:PG  Q:(SUM(I, GB(I)))
I:PA(I)  Q:GB(I)
Neither does the aggregation of the investment good
*  CAPITAL FORMATIONt
SPROD:NVK
OsPNVK  Q:(SUM(I, la(,)))
I:PA(I)  Q:IB(I)
Domestic consumer and government endowments (E:) and expenditures  (D:).




E:PNVK  Q:(-SUM(I, IB(,)))
E:PFX Q:BOPDEF
E:PG  Q:(-GOVDEF)
E:PU  Q:-l  R:TAU("LS")
E:PU  Qsl  R:TAU("LO")
DtPU  Q:UB
*  GOVERNMENT AGENT:
$DEMAND:GOVT
E:PG  Q:GOVDEF
E:PU  Q:l  R:TAU("LS")
E:PU  Q:-1  R:TAU("LO")
D:PG
*  AUXILIARY CONSTRAINTS DETERMINE LEVELS OF FACTOR OR LUMPSUM
*  TAXATION, DEPENDING ON WHICH INSTRUMENT IS USED TO ACHIEVE
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